Introduction
Over the period 1960 to 2000 intra-EU trade has grown by an impressive 1200 per cent in real terms (6.7 per cent per annum), compared with a more moderate 730 per cent growth of the EU countries' trade with the rest of the world (see Table A1 in the Appendix). This impressive growth performance indicates strong trade creating forces in Europe and offers a valuable source for investigating the determinants of the growth of trade in general and the role of European integration in particular.
Krugman's (1995) statement that the fundamental question of the determinants of the growth of trade has remained surprisingly disputed over a long time, triggered an ongoing debate on this issue. More recently, Baier and Bergstrand (2001) undertook a comprehensive investigation of the determinants of the growth of world trade. Estimating a cross-section gravity equation they conclude that income growth and tariff reductions were the major propelling forces. The reduction in trade costs still played some role, while income convergence was only of minor importance. An implicit conclusion is that the GATT/WTOliberalization, accounting for a large part of the tariff reductions, was a propelling force of world trade. This (indirect) conclusion of the results was at least called into question by Rose (2002, p. 22) , who does not find a significant effect of GATT/WTO membership (measured by zero-one dummies) in a gravity approach and concludes that "it is surprisingly hard to demonstrate convincingly that the GATT and the WTO have encouraged trade". In contrast he finds that "regional trade associations seem typically to have a much larger effect than the multilateral GATT/WTO system; nine of the ten RTAs have point estimates greater than .7 (all are statistically significant), indicating that trade at least doubles with membership" but that "Curiously, the outlier is the EEC/EC/EU." (Rose, 2002 , Appendix, p. 10). Thus, Rose indirectly also challenges the trade creating role of European integration, although he admits himself the curiosity of this argument, leading him to the following qualification of his results: "One should not conclude the GATT and WTO have not increased trade (although I wish it was easier to see in the data). Rather, since common sense and conventional wisdom accord an important role to the GATT/WTO in creating trade, I prefer to view this negative result as an interesting mystery." (Rose, 2002, p. 22) .
Against the background of these ambiguous results, in particular for the case of European integration, more empirical work on this issue seems warranted. The enormous growth of intra-EU trade, together with considerable variation across separate trade flows offers a potentially valuable source to re-examine these questions in a more comprehensive approach.
In particular, the availability of data over the comparably long period of 1960 to 2000 allows us to use a panel approach. Besides the obvious advantage of more observations and potentially more precise estimates, it allows us to control for country-specific and timespecific effects. Furthermore it enables us to conduct a more rigorous robustness analysis, including the extension to a dynamic specification and the consideration of potential endogeneity concerns. Finally, the focus on intra-EU trade allows us to asses the role of European integration, since the elimination of intra-EU tariffs is unambiguously linked to European integration.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section I we briefly review the model by Baier and Bergstrand (2001) , on which our empirical analysis will be based. In section II we present the data used in the estimation of our empirical model in section III. In section IV we summarize the results and conclude.
I. Theoretical background and empirical model
The theoretical background for our study is provided by the model of Baier and Bergstrand (2001) , which is a synthesis and generalization of previous work on the gravity equation.
Accounting for expenditure constraints, emphasized by Anderson (1979) , market structure, stressed by and Krugman and Helpman (1985) , and distribution costs, emphasized by Bergstrand (1985) it provides the adequate formal framework for our research question.
We can only briefly sketch the essential features of the model here: On the demand side, a representative consumer in country i maximizes a constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) utility function over all available varieties of goods in every country subject to a budget constraint, where prices of the imported goods reflect iceberg transportation costs and ad valorem tariffs. The solution to this utility maximization yields an import demand function for the product of a representative firm in country j. This representative firm faces monopolistic competition and maximizes its profits subject to two technology constraints: First, the production of goods has fixed and constant marginal costs. Second, the presence of distribution costs lets firms face each potential market's supply as imperfect substitutes, which is reflected formally in a constant-elasticity-of-transformation (CET) function (see Powell and Gruen, 1968) . This implies that firms incur cost when they substitute output between foreign markets due to tailoring the product, marketing and distribution to the particular market. The resulting long-run (supply-side) equilibrium is characterized by two conditions: i) Prices are a mark-up over marginal costs, which depends on the elasticity of substitution in consumption. ii) Under monopolistic competition, firms earn zero profits.
From these conditions, bilateral export supply functions of the representative firm can be derived and set equal to the respective import demand functions. The model is closed by the assumption of full employment and a given factor endowment (labour), which determines the available varieties of goods. At the bottom line, the model ultimately yields an equilibrium solution for the bilateral exports from country i to j ( j i X ), which can be written in logdifferences as follows:
2 is an expression for income convergence, whose trade stimulating role was stressed by Helpman (1987) . According to the theoretical model, the parameters β 1 and β 2 should equal two and one, respectively. The interpretation of the next two variables is straightforward: both tariffs for exports from country i to country j ( j i T ) and trade costs for exports from i to j ( j i TC ) should yield a negative coefficient. The coefficient of ∆Y j depends on the elasticity of transformation of output across markets and should equal zero if production is perfectly substitutable between home and foreign markets; in the case of a finite elasticity of substitution, a negative sign would be expected. The last variable is a ratio of two Dixit-Stiglitz price indices 1 ; according to the theoretical model, a negative coefficient is expected. As opposed to all other variables, however, these price indices are not observable and can only be proxied crudely, using the ratio of the countries' GDP deflators. Equation (1) will be the point of departure for our estimation. Before presenting the results of our estimations we give a brief description of the data.
II. Data
As opposed to the cross-section approach by Baier and Bergstrand we use a panel to estimate the gravity equation described above. This has some obvious advantages: First, we have more observations and potentially less multicollinearity, which should yield more precise estimates.
Second, it allows to control for cross-section-specific time-invariant effects as well as time-1 P j C is an index of landed prices in country j of products from all markets (resulting from the CES utility function), and P i F is an index of the firm i's prices (resulting from the CET function).
specific cross-section-invariant effects. Third, it extends easily to a dynamic model and allows us to address potential endogeneity problems of the right hand side variables. Table 1 gives an overview of the definition of the variables and the data used in the estimation. T , tariff (of country j) for exports from country i to country j (as fraction of one); time series constructed using the country-specific external tariffs in 1950 according to Breuss (1983) and accounting for the average tariff reductions following the GATT rounds (Source: WTO, 1995) and tariff changes as a result of European Integration, i.e. adoption of harmonized external tariff and elimination of intra-EC tariffs after EC (EU) accesion , respectively in course of the free trade agreements between EC and EFTA in the 70s. See Table 2 for details on the assumed timing and size of the tariff reductions. The time period considered ranges from 1960 to 2000, including all major steps from European integration since the Customs Union. In order to smooth out cyclical fluctuations and short-run shocks, we use overlapping, five year periods (1960-1965, 1965-1970, . . . , 1995-2000) . We have also data for the period from 1950 to 1960, but restrict our main analysis to the period as of 1960 for two reasons: First, data for 1950 to 1960 are less reliable with a number of missing observations, which had to be interpolated. Second, we also want to reserve two lagged observations, which we will need when running two-stages least squares with lags as instruments. Summing up, we have a sample of 182 cross-section units, each of which with eight observations, yielding us a total sample size of 1456 observations. Note that only some of the variables are really trade-flow-specific, while some of them are only cross-section specific. Also note that TC and REER refer to economic relationships with the whole world, not only with the EU; due to the dominant share of EU-relationship, however, this slight deviation from theory seems admissible.
III. Estimation results
The empirical counterpart of the theoretical model above is given by Our estimation exercise proceeds as follows: First, we will present the estimation results for the static model as given by (2), using the standard least squares dummy variable estimator.
Then we will extend model (2) to a dynamic specification, which offers a convenient framework to address endogeneity concerns, too. Since dynamic panels require other estimators than static panels, we will briefly discuss some econometric issues before turning to the estimation of the dynamic model. Finally, we will use our preferred models to simulate the growth of intra-EU trade in order to asses the relative importance of the respective variables.
Results for static models
Results from a least square dummy variable (LSDV) estimation of model (2) are given in Table 3 . A look at the coefficients of ∆ln(Y it +Y jt ) and ∆Y jt in columns (a) and (b) suggests a multicollinearity problem with these two variables; indeed, their correlation amounts to 0.80.
Thus, ∆lnY j can be assumed to measure not the elasticity of transformation, which would suggest a coefficient smaller than or equal to zero, but also an income effect. After excluding The detailed results are given in the Appendix (Table A2) So far, our sensitivity analysis shows a very robust relationship between growth of trade and income growth, income convergence, tariff reductions and changes in the real effective exchange rate, with coefficients close to the predictions of the theoretical model. 
Results for dynamic models
It is well-known that the LSDV-estimator is biased in dynamic panels (Nickell, 1981) .
Although this bias tends to zero as the time dimension of the panel approaches infinity, it cannot be ignored in our particular panel with a large number of cross-section units and a short time range. In contrast to the LSDV estimates of (1+γ), which is biased downward as shown by Nickell (1981) , the pooled OLS estimator of (4) with a common intercept will produce an upward biased estimate of (1+γ) in the presence of fixed effects (Hsiao, 1986).
Thus, the LSDV and the pooled OLS estimator provide a range for a plausible parameter estimate.
In order to obtain consistent parameter estimates in dynamic panels, instrumental variable procedures have been suggested in the literature. Thereby, the fixed effects µ i are eliminated using first differences; this however, induces correlation between the differenced error term Validity of instruments requires the absence of second order serial correlation in the residuals;
overall validity of instruments can also be tested using a Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions (see Arellano and Bond, 1991 , for the more details on the test). The FirstDifferences-GMM estimator was criticized recently by Blundell and Bond (1998) , who argue that levels may be valid, but poor instruments for first differences, in particular if data is highly persistent. An indication of such a poor quality may be that the First-Differences-GMM estimate of (1+γ) is close to its (downward-biased) LSDV estimate (see Bond et al., 2001 ). Blundell and Bond (1998) suggest a system GMM estimator, which supplements the equations in first differences with equations in levels, where in the levels equations, lagged differences ∆y i,t-1 are used as instruments for y i,t-1 . This is based on the assumption that 0 ) ( 2 = ∆ i i y E µ for i = 1,...,N, which (together with the standard assumptions for the first differences estimator) yields the additional moment conditions 0 ) ( . Other estimators were also suggested (see Baltagi, 2001 ), none of which can claim to be superior in all cases. We will thus restrict our attention to the first differences and the GMM estimator.
The GMM framework, either in first differences or in a system framework, offers a convenient way to address also the problem of measurement error or potentially endogenous or predetermined right hand side variables. Since causality may also run from trade to growth, the variables (Y i + Y j ) as well as s i s j in equation (3) or (4) for the validity of instruments; in fact it deteriorates if endogeneity is assumed. Thus we regard the assumption of predeterminedness as sufficient, but hasten to add that the size of the parameter estimates hardly differs, when endogeneity is allowed for. Columns (e) and (f) show the estimates using the system-GMM estimator by Blundell and Bond (1998) , again assuming predeterminedness in column (f). Note that the coefficients of lnX i,t-1 show the expected relationships; Both GMM estimators lie in the bound provided by the LSDV and the OLS estimate, the system estimator yielding a slightly higher coefficient.
Since the GMM estimate of (1+γ) in first differences differs hardly from the system estimate, we appears to be no weak instruments problem in our case. A more relevant point is, whether exogeneity or predeterminedness is assumed, since the coefficients of ∆ln( Y i + Y j ) and ∆ln(s i s j ) change substantially. The highly significant Sargan test in columns (c) and (e), where exogeneity is assumed, clearly gives rise to using instruments for ∆ln(Y i + Y j ) and ∆ln( s i s j ), given the absence of second-order serial correlation. Indeed, the Sargan test can be improved substantially by assuming predeterminedness of ∆ln( Y i + Y j ) and ∆ln(s i s j ), although it remains significant at the 10 per cent level in the case of the first-differences estimator. As already outlined above the assumption of endogeneity did not improve the Sargan test. Thus, our preferred dynamic estimates are given by column (f), using the system GMM estimator with ∆ln(Y i + Y j ) and ∆ln( s i s j ) treated as predetermined. Since the instruments used, contain those of column (d) as a subset, some doubts remain on the failure of the Sargan test to reject the null of valid instruments. It is interesting to note that the long-run coefficients of our preferred dynamic estimates (but also that of column (d)) differ only slightly from the results of our static model. Thus, we may conclude that our results do not differ substantially, when a dynamic structure of the models is controlled for.
Simulations
We go on to simulate the growth of intra EU-trade over the period 1960 to 2000 in order to identify the importance of the respective variables. Table 5 shows the results, when our preferred static model is used. Table 6 shows the results from using the preferred dynamic dynamic models for the simulation. We start from a scenario with purely exogenous growth of trade, where only fixed effects, the time specific effects and the residuals (and the lagged endogenous variable) are included, i.e. where β 1 , β 2 , β 3 and β 7 have been set to zero in equation (3) and (4), respectively. We then set the paramters of ∆ln(Y i + Y j ), ∆ln(s i s j ), ∆ln(1+T ij ) and ∆lnREER i to their estimate value, so that we end up with simulating the actual scenario. Tables 5 and 6 Finally, a further interesting direction for future research is the question, whether there are asymmetric gains from integration, as postulated by some theoretical models: An example is the model by Casella (1996) , which postulates that the gains from enlarging a trade bloc fall disproportionately on its small Member States. Since these models generally assume economies of scale, more disaggregated sectoral data may be informative on whether such asymmetric gains exist in certain types of industries which exhibit increasing returns. Thus, the issue of potential asymmetries in the gains from integration (e.g. with respect to country size) remains an interesting and challenging line of both theoretical and empirical research. Table 3 for different estimation periods.
